A Female Preference for Irrationality? The Pure Nonsense of FEMINISTS & CONTRACT DOCTRINE

A Female Preference for Irrationality?  FEMINISTS & CONTRACT DOCTRINE


https://mckinneylaw.iu.edu/ILR/pdf/vol32p1247.pdf

"Therefore, it should not be surprising that “law” incorporates and reflects male gender traits. Some of these traits are identified as the preference  for rationality over other ways of knowing (e.g., intuition); for objectivity over subjectivity; for abstraction over contextualization; and for hierarchical decision making over consensus or compromise. Contract law, like law more generally,  is said to be male-gendered because of the perceived presence of these traits.  In other words, contract law is not neutral; it is one of the many social structures that supports a male preference. Further, it is not objective; it has a perspective, but its point of view is masked."

In addition to being strange reasoning,  this seems to be self-contradictory. It is a male preference for "objectivity over subjectivity" but the law incorporates male gender traits and "it is not objective?" So if the law is not objective, how does the law incorporate the male preference for objectivity?

Perhaps, one must be irrational to make sense of this apparent contradiction?

Rationality versus other ways of knowing?  For something to be knowledge, it must be true. A belief that is demonstrably false cannot be "knowledge." A belief that is unsupported by objective evidence cannot be termed "knowledge" because it might not be true.  Intuition may be based on knowledge, but intuition itself is not knowledge. Sometimes intuition is not correct. When the intuition is objectively shown to be factual, then it becomes knowledge.

If contracts were never disputed, this paper's attack on rationality and objectivity would be moot. But, in any disputed contract, there will have to be an objective judgment of the actions to be taken. The judgment cannot be "subjective" with each party to the contract deciding that the judgment means different things.  That is, in the end, contract law has to be objective.  This paper seems to be arguing against writing contracts that are as clear and objective as possible, in favor of intentionally subjective and ambiguous contracts.  This would seem to be a recipe for ensuring that legal judgments are arbitrary and capricious, depending mostly on the whim of the court, rather than an agreement between the parties.